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Summary. In this introduction to the special issue on Biosemiotic Ethics, we introduce 
major concepts and themes corresponding to the topic. With reference to Ivar Puura’s 
notion of “semiocide”, we ask: what are the ethical responsibilities that attention to semi-
otics carries? We argue that if life is fundamentally semiotic, then biosemiotics and moral 
theory should be explored in conjunction, rather than separately. Biosemiotic ethics 
becomes relevant whenever one complex of signs impinges on another; particularly 
whenever human sign usage impinges on the wellbeing or sustainable functioning of 
human or non-human semiotic agents. Stable coexistence of sign systems is far from 
inevitable, but it is a meaningful goal that can be pursued. In complex ecosystems, for 
example, certain types of coexistent relationships have evolved to share space despi-
te competitive needs and expressions. We describe the ways in which authors in this 
volume articulate various justifications for the view that what is morally relevant is semi-
osis. Given these perspectives in a growing approach to understanding moral relation-
ships, biosemiotic ethics has the decisive advantage of drawing on contemporary bio-
semiotics’ empirically-informed biological acuity within a rich semiotic framework.
Zusammenfassung. In dieser Einleitung zum Themenheft über biosemiotische Ethik stel-
len wir die wichtigsten Konzepte und Fragestellungen vor, die mit dem Thema zusammen-
hängen. Unter Bezug auf Ivar Puuras Vorstellung eines „Semiozids“ fragen wir: Welche 
ethischen Verantwortlichkeiten ergeben sich aus der semiotischen Betrachtung? Wir argu-
mentieren, dass, wenn Leben fundamental semiotisch ist, Biosemiotik und Moraltheorie 
nicht getrennt betrachtet werden können. Biosemiotische Ethik wird immer dann relevant, 
wenn ein Zeichenkomplex auf einen anderen einwirkt, insbesondere dann, wenn mensch-
licher Zeichengebrauch sich auf das Wohlergehen oder nachhaltige Funktionieren mensch-
licher oder nicht-menschlicher semiotischer Akteure auswirkt. Die symbiotische Koexis-
tenz von Zeichensystemen ist keinesfalls selbstverständlich, kann aber zur bedeutsamen 
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Zielsetzung werden. So haben sich zum Beispiel in komplexen Ökosystemen bestimmte 
Typen koexistenter Beziehungen entwickelt, in denen trotz kompetitiver Bedürfnisse und 
Äußerungen der vorhandene Raum geteilt wird. Wir beschreiben die verschiedenen mög-
lichen Begründungen für die moralische Relevanz von Semiose, die von den AutorInnen 
dieses Bandes geliefert werden. Berücksichtigt man diese Perspektiven bei der wachsen-
den Annäherung an das Verständnis moralischer Beziehungen, dann zeigt sich der ent-
scheidende Vorteil biosemiotischer Ethik darin, die empirisch fundierte biologische Exakt-
heit der zeitgenössischen Biosemiotik innerhalb eines reichhaltigen semiotischen Rah-
mensystems fruchtbar zu machen.
1.  From Biosemiotics to Biosemiotic Ethics
Nearly twenty years ago, two of the most central contemporary biosemioti-
cians, first Jesper Hoffmeyer (1993) and then Kalevi Kull (2001), addressed 
connections between biosemiotics and ethics. In the last ten to fifteen years, 
a new generation of scholars have started working out the shape and impli-
cations of a biosemiotic approach to ethics (see e.g. Tønnessen 2003; Bee-
ver 2011; Champagne 2011; Acampora 2014; Tønnessen and Beever 2014). 
The foundational idea is that if all living systems are semiotic, then biose-
miosis can serve as basis for justifying attribution of moral status not only 
to human individuals but also to non-human individuals and to various eco-
logical entities as well. Most of the scholars involved in this endeavor have 
taken Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory as their starting point in biology 
(cf. Beever and Tønnessen 2013; Uexküll 2013) and Charles Sanders Peir-
ce as the theoretical framing of semiotic interactions (Favareau 2010a). 
Uexküll’s Umwelt theory focuses attention on the phenomenological expe-
rience of individual organisms in their unique worlds of experience. In a 
modern interpretation, Peirce’s tripartite semiotic model opens space for 
thinking about the richness of meaningful interactions among and between 
organisms and their environments. These framing theories were put to expli-
cit use in what would become biosemiotics in the work of semiotician Tho-
mas Sebeok (1920–2001).
The lifework of Thomas Sebeok culminated in the development of the 
contemporary field of biosemiotics. As Don Favareau notes in his Essen-
tial Readings in Biosemiotics, “Sebeok was not the first to coin the com-
pound noun joining ‘bio’ with ‘semiotics’, however, it is the specific project 
that Sebeok initiated and christened as such that is the subject of this his-
tory” (Favareau 2010a: 35). While Sebeok first established zoosemiotics, 
the study of animal semiosis, as a field, he “shifted to using ‘biosemiotics’ 
as a general term in the 1990s” (Maran 2014: 1). See also Kalevi Kull (1999: 
128), who claims that 
biosemiotics as a discipline or field was born […] at the beginning of the 1990s, 
since this is the decade, when the name was taken into use in the titles of books 
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and conferences, when an international society-like group of people appeared who 
regularly met and made attempts to approximate to each other’s terminology, when 
the first university courses on the subject appeared, and when the history of the field 
was first reviewed (or built and constructed). 
However, “as a domain”, Kull (1999: 128) claims, biosemiotics “has existed 
[…] at least since the first decades of [the 20th] century”. Biosemiotic ana-
lysis has been applied in many different contexts as well, including not only 
biological but also cultural issues.
Both cultural and biological diversity – the former arguably being a sub-
category of the latter – can be conceived of in terms of semiotic diversity. 
The Estonian geologist and paleontologist Ivar Puura (1961–2012) coined 
the notion of semiocide, “a situation in which signs and stories that are sig-
nificant for someone are destroyed because of someone else’s malevo-
lence or carelessness, thereby stealing a part of the former’s identity” (Puura 
2013: 152). “By wholesale replacement of primeval nature with artificial 
environments”, writes Puura (2013: 152), “[a]t the hands of humans, milli-
ons of stories with billions of relations and variations perish”. As Timo Maran 
(2013) remarks, according to Puura 
the phenomenon of semiocide is very widespread both in human culture and soci-
ety as well as in relations between culture and nature. Unfortunately, semiotics 
appears to have overlooked this dark side of semiotic relations, as is evident from 
the lack of a conceptual framework and studies dedicated to this topic. […] This is 
a question of the ethical responsibility of semiotics (Maran 2013: 148).
Respecting the semiotic richness of others – be they human or not – is key 
for taking the field of semiotics beyond logical or conceptual analysis. Con-
necting semiotic fitness and the interface of competing semiotic structures 
with moral value allows for self-reflexivity towards the way and means of 
sign usage, especially insofar as one complex of signs impinges on another. 
Such considerations are relevant for better understanding what is lost 
when one culture conquers or absorbs another. In such cases, the loss of 
orientation accompanying the fragmentation of one’s semiotic framework 
has implications for capabilities such as interactions with other species, 
emotional attachments, and modes of play (Nussbaum 2009), which affect 
one’s self-identity (Wolch 2002) and hence ability for survival and thriving 
in a semiotically-foreign milieu (Böll 2008; Wheeler 2006). Extricating beings 
from their semiotic niches, especially fully-formed people or organisms – 
less adaptive to retool their semiotic reference points that anchor their beha-
vior and self-conception – can be conceived as a sort of violence in its mani-
fold disorienting effects. 
Paying additional attention to the effects of signs – their externalities, as 
it were – allows for what Merleau-Ponty (1968) terms surréflection: using 
our human strength of abstraction to reflect upon our own reflections for 
the sake of overcoming dominating behavior. Stressed here is the sobering 
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realization that a democratic or symbiotic coexistence of sign systems is 
far from an inevitable outcome, but instead something that should be assi-
duously attended to, if such an outcome is valued. 
“Signs can be cultivated”, Tønnessen (2009: 78) states. “Signs can be 
grown. How else would we be able to conquer this planet?” As signs evol-
ve, and certain cohesive sets of signs become commodified, infecting the 
semiosphere at large, the question arises: “can we still develop a semi-
otic [ethical] code” in times of semiotic hegemony? Is it still possible to 
cultivate a “code of conduct for the semiotic animal?” Such an enterpri-
se “would amount to a proper semioethics” (Tønnessen 2009: 78). This 
infectious growth of signs, both cultural and biological, gives rise to one 
way of understanding a (bio)semiotic ethic: as a human responsibility to 
e t h i c a l l y  cultivate, harvest, and tend that growth of meaning in the world.
2.  The Ethology of Power Struggles
Meaningful relationships are key to a semiotic understanding of nature and 
society alike, implying that we cannot properly understand human-animal 
relations in any fully detached, distanced manner. In many cases, under-
standing the ways of a living being presupposes b e i n g  w i t h  it – we can 
only properly understand that of which we are part ourselves. Rather than 
what Ulrich Beck (1992) has called “distanciated” science, biosemiotic ethics 
draws on emerging paradigms of biological and social research based on 
including experimenters in the observation (see Nagel 1986 and Merskin 
2010). “The ethologist”, writes Dominique Lestel (2011: 98), “has to be as 
creative as possible. The more creative he or she becomes, so the more com-
plex and interesting the animal becomes.” Animals do “not allow for their 
objective [distanced, impersonal] description, because understanding them 
requires us to work with the animal (rather than on the animal)” (Lestel 2011: 
92). Studying animals in an impersonal way, then, does not say much about 
how we humans can live in community with animals. Refusing to allow oneself 
to enter into the semiotic world of another – human or more-than-human – 
can amount to a sort of semiotic imperialism, the very sort excoriated by an 
ethical biosemiotics. Only humans – initially,  a certain subsection of humans, 
mainly landed men of European origins – have uniquely adapted to syste-
matically ignore, numb out, or purposefully overlook the signs of their own 
conspecifics and interspecifics, when this suits their instrumental purposes. 
In a sense, one could say that human instrumentality is unique in life, thus 
requiring a unique ethics. Power struggles like these between humans and 
non-humans can be analysed in terms of semiotic agency, as associated 
with agency theory in economics and political science. 
Also in the living realm at large […] prospective ‘principals’ attempt to establish “prin-
cipal–agent” relationships, where the recruited ‘agent’, which might or might not be 
directly submissive, is expected to act in the interests of the principal, so as to maxi-
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mize its welfare rather than its own. […] As examples, livestock stereotypically repre-
sent ‘agents’ subjected to the care of human ‘principals’, with the task of maximizing 
the welfare of human beings as their raison d’être, and well-functioning working ani-
mals (such as guide dogs for the blind, or police dogs) are in a sense by definition 
agents for human principals (Tønnessen 2015: 140).
Indeed, such semiotic power struggles happen amongst nonhumans as 
well, such as when ants harvest mushroom farms (Witte and Maschwitz 
2008), or when cordyceps mushrooms harvest ants (Evans and Samson 
1982). While principal–agent relations are not morally suspicious by defi-
nition, a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics must question which 
relations, among a number of existing and possible principal-agent rela-
tions, are morally acceptable and which ones are not. Biosemiotic ethics, 
which tends to emphasize that all living/semiosic beings have moral stan-
ding, will typically hold that the welfare of principals and agents alike mat-
ter equally (in the sense that both principals and agents have equally legi-
timate needs that should be met as far as possible). This loose egalitarian 
view entails, at the very least, that principal-agent relationships that are 
systematically biased towards supporting the welfare of the human princi-
pal only (versus a non-human agent) are morally illegitimate unless further 
justified. The onus for certifying human-nonhuman relationships which are 
steeply hierarchic, then, rests with the benefitting humans. These concep-
tual and ethical struggles are at the heart of biosemiotics, which must wrest-
le with the value conflicts between cultural and broader biological biosemi-
otic value claims.
Such ethical imaginings are predicated not only on viewing nonhuman 
beings as semiotic agents, but also, as a result, as beings deserving of 
moral standing, however differentially conceived. This can furthermore be 
parsed into beings that display varying degrees of what we would term pos-
sible moral agency, and those where such abilities are not apparent. Thus, 
one central biosemiotic ethical question is: to what extent, if any, should 
non-humans be regarded as moral agents (cf. Deely and Hendlin in this 
special issue)? And if so, in what circumstances are they ethical? From a 
biosemiotic standpoint, this raises a variety of issues, including the questi-
on of nonhuman ethics. 
In the past decades plural conceptions of ethical behavior have appeared 
as perhaps incommensurable, but nonetheless valid within the specific con-
cepts and Weltanschauungen in which they occur (cf. Dryzek 2000; Parek 
2002). In a similar manner, the very concept of ethics is stretched if we pos-
tulate that ethics from a nonhuman point of view might be similarly valid (in 
their own ecological and species-specific milieus vis-à-vis the participating 
parties) as our own anthropological ones. 
Val Plumwood elaborates the need to deconstruct the conceptual and ethi-
cal siloing of humans and nature as separate categories that leads to ascri-
bing ethics as the domain solely of humans (2002: 51): “The idea that we 
humans are completely immersed in a self-enclosed sphere of our own we 
Morten Tønnessen, Jonathan Beever and Yogi Hale Hendlin8
can call ‘culture’ while non-humans are part of a non-ethical sphere of ‘nature’ 
is the leading assumption that corresponds to and structures these discipli-
nary exclusions”. Thus, in keeping with Uexküll’s original insight that different 
sensorially-composed organisms perceive and interpret their surroundings 
correspondingly, so too, one might claim, what counts as ethical action may 
take varying forms according to the relating species (Hendlin 2016).
As Arne Johan Vetlesen (2015: 3) points out, our “culture increasingly 
renders nature abstract: out of sight, out of mind”, and ecological devasta-
tion as a process is “accompanied by a mindset of abstraction: what is being 
done to nature in and by this culture is not in any firsthand way experienced, 
sensed, felt by the majority of the agents involved in the destructive practi-
ces in question” (Vetlesen 2015: 3). We concur with Vetlesen that it is para-
mount that environmental philosophers should pay “attention to the empi-
rically informed literature about what life is actually like for humans and for 
nature in the era of twenty-first century global capitalism” (Vetlesen 2015: 
2). In consequence, environmental philosophers “should be wary of perpe-
tuating such abstraction” (Vetlesen 2015: 3) that underlies ethical accounts 
that pretend that “the ontological as well as moral nature of [the human–
nature relation] and the entities making it up can be inquired into as well as 
settled once and for all, sub specie aeternitatis” (Vetlesen 2015: 2). Biose-
miotic ethics is, and must be, empirically informed. “The scientific founda-
tion of contemporary biosemiotic theory”, as Beever (2011: 181) states, 
“grounds a theory of moral value capable of addressing [the problem of 
determining and defining the scope of moral value]”, by suggesting “that 
what is morally relevant is semiosis”. 
At any rate, biosemiotics acknowledges that all living beings have some 
form of semiotic agency and that this includes a measure (which varies) of 
autonomy. Some would hold that a key feature of a biosemiotic approach 
to ethics should be to respect, and be sensitive with regard to, such semi-
otic agency and autonomy in everything that lives. How this cashes out is 
at the heart of the contemporary discussion about the nature and future of 
biosemiotic ethics.
3.  Outline of the Issue
In this volume, we bring together contemporary scholars giving voice to bio-
semiotic ethics in order to explore the sorts of concepts and conflicts iden-
tified above.
Semiotician and philosopher John D e e l y  carefully engages in the 
discourse of biosemiotic ethics, articulating conceptual distinctions bet-
ween types of signs and types of environments that lead him to a “semio-
ethical” conclusion; namely, that all and only human beings are capable 
of a type of semiosis with direct ethical implications. Human responsibili-
ty in and to the semiosphere is an ethical result of this morally laden semi-
otic ability. 
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B e e v e r  and T ø n n e s s e n  identify conceptual tensions in justifying the 
connection between semiosis and moral relevance. They propose a parti-
cularist view: biosemiotic ethics, on their account, must focus on the parti-
cular context of the individual organism and its unique ecological relation-
ships. Without this specific focus, biosemiotic ethics overreaches both con-
ceptually and normatively.
Andreas W e b e r  engages this same conceptual work in marking out 
a wide swath of concepts that, on his account, must be carefully analyzed 
before a biosemiotic approach to ethics can take hold. The rich interplay 
among these concepts, from meaningful relationships, to the nature of bio-
logical subjecthood, to the structure of ontology, form the basis for a biose-
miotic ethic. Weber calls this interplay poetic objectivity – an ethically rich 
view of reality that is shared among individuals, generations, and ecologi-
cal contexts.
Yogi H e n d l i n  pushes proposals for moral standing in biosemiotic 
ethics outward, arguing for consideration of the ethical implications of inter-
species and conspecific semiosic interactions, i.e. implicitly semiotically 
motivated moral agenthood. On Hendlin’s read, a focus on the level of free-
dom of semiosic communication entails that the greater the semiotic free-
dom, the more ethically rich we interpreters are likely to view it as.
Hans Werner I n g e n s i e p  sets out to investigate bio-phenomena such 
as motion, emotion and cognition from a point of view informed by biose-
miotics. His article makes use of three examples: Apes, kingfishers, and 
the Mimosa pudica, also called sensitive plant, in an inquiry into the ethi-
cal relevance of different phenomena in nature. With this angle, Ingensiep 
builds on but also challenges the traditional division of nature into human 
– animal – plant. 
Animals, Jessica U l l r i c h  explains, feature in contemporary art as 
motif, material or medium, and in some cases this practice has been criti-
cized for being ethically problematic. Other artists, however, explore deve-
lopment of artworks that let animals play a more active and autonomous 
performatory role. In her article, she examines the semiotic contributions 
of animals in such works of art, aiming to arrive at observations on what 
ethically responsible art featuring live animals might look like. 
Konrad O t t  develops a biosemiotically oriented discourse ethics. At first 
glance, discourse ethics is not necessarily suited as framework for deve-
lopment of non-anthropocentric ethics, since, in Jürgen Habermas’ pionee-
ring version, it presupposes that only human beings are communicative in 
the sense of having language. Traditionally, then, discourse ethics has been 
limited to the human realm. The challenge of overcoming discourse ethics’ 
traditional anthropocentric bias makes Ott’s contribution all the more intri-
guing.
Gerald O s t d i e k , in a thoughtful review of Deely’s essay in this issue, 
works to further and extend that careful analysis. Ostdiek argues that the 
semiotic/semiosic distinction might not break at the level of the human: 
signs evolve, and so conceptual distinctions must as well.
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London Metropolitan University Emerita Professor of English Literature and 
Cultural Inquiry Wendy W h e e l e r  shares her thoughts on biosemiotics 
and ethics in an interview with the editors of this special edition. From 
Wheeler’s perspective, a biosemiotic ethics must be grounded in what may 
be a radically new ontology, a view of the world and its relations. Under-
standing interdependence, or ecology, in semiotic terms can help shift our 
moral intuitions about what matters and why – and direct attention to a bio-
semiotic approach to ethics. 
As biosemiotic approaches to ethics continue to grow, they must be care-
fully cultivated, pruned, shaped, and tended by the community of inquirers 
from whom they have germinated. We are pleased to have edited this volu-
me toward that end.
Notes
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Ullrich and Andreas Weber.  We further thank Paul Cobley for editing John Deely’s 
contribution. Tønnessen’s work with this article has been carried out thanks to the 
support of the research project Animals in Changing Environments: Cultural Medi-
ation and Semiotic Analysis (EEA Norway Grants/Norway Financial Mechanism 
2009–2014 under project contract no. EMP151).
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